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Abstract 
 
Organizational boards of directors are one of the most important subgroups within most 
modern organizations, performing critical advisory, monitoring and resource dependence 
roles. This paper investigates the crucial question of whether the stock market values ethnic 
and gender diversity within organizational boards. We find that board diversity is positively 
associated with market valuation. We distinctively demonstrate further that ethnic diversity 
is valued more highly by the stock market than gender diversity. By contrast, we do not 
find any evidence of a significant non-linear link between board diversity and market 
valuation. Our findings are robust across a number of econometric models that deal with 
different types of endogeneities and market valuation measures. Overall, our results are 
consistent with agency and resource dependence theoretical predictions.  
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1 Introduction 
Organizational boards of directors are one of the most important subgroups within the top 
management of most modern organizations (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Robertson and Park, 2007; 
Mahadeo et al., 2012; Arnegger et al., 2013; Bart and McQueen, 2013; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; 
Luckerath-Rovers, 2013), performing strategic functions, including advising, monitoring, 
disciplining, motivating and compensating managers, as well as providing access to critical 
resources, such as business contracts, contacts and finance (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; 
Welbourne et al., 2007; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Abdullah, 2013; Triana et al., 2013; Wellage 
and Locke, 2013). This paper examines the crucial question of whether the South African (SA) 
stock market values ethnic and gender diversity among the boards of publicly listed organizations. 
Specifically, we exploit a natural and unique organizational context in SA, where recent regulatory, 
affirmative action, and organizational governance (OG) reforms uniquely require listed 
organizations to formally compose diverse boards on the basis of ethnicity and gender to investigate 
whether board diversity can explain observable variations in their market value.  
 Although SA has been widely recognised as one of the most ethnically diverse countries in 
the world (Armstrong et al., 2006; West, 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b), long-standing 
apartheid policy of racial, social, economic and political segregation resulted in largely 
homogenous organizational boards (Ho and Williams, 2003; Swartz and Firer, 2005). As will be 
discussed further, and following the collapse of apartheid in 1994, a number of regulatory, 
affirmative action, and OG reforms have been pursued aimed at enhancing diversity within SA 
organizational boards (Armstrong et al., 2006; West, 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a). These 
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reforms include the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on OG, the 1998 Employment Equity Act, and the 
2003 Black Economic Empowerment Act.
1
  
Generally, the reforms, especially the King Reports have focused on improving governance 
standards in SA public organizations (King Committee, 2002; Rossouw et al., 2002; Armstrong et 
al., 2006; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a). A more specific objective of these reforms, however, has 
been to increase the monitoring power of SA organizational boards by improving board 
effectiveness and efficiency (West, 2009; Andreasson, 2013), and thereby enhancing the overall 
market value. A key determinant of organizational boards‟ operational and functional effectiveness 
and efficiency is the degree of ethnic and gender diversity (Pfeffer, 1973; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Jensen, 1993; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Krishman and Park, 2005; Kang et al., 2007; Campbell and 
Minquez-Vera, 2008; Bart and McQueen, 2013). Arguably, these unique regulatory and OG 
reforms provide a significant impetus to investigate the extent to which board diversity on the basis 
of ethnicity and gender influence market valuation in a major emerging economic power. 
Apart from the distinctive regulatory and OG reforms pursued, it has been argued that the 
association between board diversity and market valuation may not just vary by organizational-level 
heterogeneities (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Goodstein et al., 
1994), but also by variations in country-level regulatory, OG and institutional features (van der 
Walt and Ingley, 2003; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Singh, 2007). In spite of this development, 
previous studies investigating the association between board diversity and market valuation are 
primarily concentrated in a small number of matured Western economies, such as US that depict 
comparatively similar institutional contexts (Gilbert and Stead, 1999; Carter et al., 2003; Catalyst, 
2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010). A further issue of concern is that existing 
                                                 
1As will be discussed further, some of the reforms set specific targets of non-white (i.e., people of Black African, Chinese, Indian and 
Mixed Race backgrounds) board representation for organizations to comply with. For example, the 1998 Employment Equity and 
2003 Black Economic Empowerment Acts set aspirational (not legally enforceable) target of 40 to 50% non-white senior 
management and/or board membership.  
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studies that have been mainly conducted in developed countries have focused largely on the 
valuation implications of board diversity on the basis of gender (Shrader et al., 1997; Burges and 
Tharenou, 2002; Erhardt et al., 2003; Welbourne et al., 2007; Johnston and Malina, 2008; Dobbin 
and Jung, 2011; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Abdullah, 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013).  
With respect to the African context, although a limited number of studies have analysed the 
impact of different OG structures, such as the frequency of board meetings (El Mehdi, 2007; Ntim 
and Osei, 2011), ownership structure (Sanda et al., 2010; Ntim, 2012, 2013), board size (Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Kyereboah-Coleman, et al., 2006) and board structure (Swartz and Firer, 2005; 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006; Sunday, 2008; Ntim, 2011) on market valuation, studies 
examining the valuation implications of ethnic and gender diversity within organizational boards 
are rare (Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Ujunwa, 2012; Ujunwa et al., 2012).  
However, it is argued that in emerging economies, such as SA with different regulatory, OG 
practices, and institutional contexts (as will be explained further), the effectiveness and efficiency 
of board diversity may vary, and as such the association between board diversity on the basis of 
ethnicity and gender, and market valuation can be expected to be different from what has been 
reported for public organizations operating in developed countries. Hence, an examination of the 
impact of board diversity on market value in emerging African markets, where there is an acute 
dearth of reliable empirical evidence (Swartz and Firer, 2005; Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 
2010; Mahadeo et al., 2012) will arguably be important in providing a more holistic understanding 
of the effect that board diversity has on market valuation (Dwyer et al., 2003; Brammer et al., 2007; 
du Plessis, 2008; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Triana et al., 2013).  
Therefore, and in this paper, we investigate the crucial policy question of whether the SA 
stock market values ethnic and gender diversity within the boards of publicly listed organizations, 
and thereby making a number of distinctive contributions to the extant literature. First, using a 
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sample of SA listed organisations, we provide evidence on the relationship between board diversity 
and market value. To the best of our knowledge, this study constitutes one of the first attempts at 
estimating the impact of board diversity on organizational valuation within an African context, with 
particular focus on SA, and thus crucially extends the literature to that continent. The study also 
contributes to the mainly developed countries-based literature on the association between board 
diversity and market valuation. Second, and different from most past studies, we show how both 
ethnic and gender diversity affect market value, and thereby shedding new crucial insights on the 
link between ethnic diversity and market value. Third, we distinctively provide evidence on the 
relative value relevance of ethnic versus gender diversity on market valuation. Fourth, we uniquely 
investigate the existence of a non-monotonic association between board diversity and market 
valuation. Finally, and distinct from most prior studies, we apply econometric methods that 
sufficiently deal with different kinds of endogeneities, as well as make use of different measures of 
market valuation.  
Our results suggest that the SA stock market values ethnic and gender diversity within 
organizational boards as there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between board 
diversity and market valuation. Distinct from prior studies, we show further that ethnic diversity is 
valued more highly by the SA stock market than gender diversity. This sheds new important 
insights on the relative value relevance of gender versus ethnic diversity on market valuation. By 
contrast, we do not find any evidence of a significant non-linear link between board diversity and 
market valuation. The central tenor of our findings remains unchanged across a number of 
econometric models that deal with different types of endogeneities and market valuation measures. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with agency and resource dependence theories, which suggest 
that ethnic and gender diversity enhances board independence, executive monitoring and decision-
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making, as well as helps to better link an organization to its external environment that facilitates 
securing critical resources, and thereby improving market valuation. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a brief overview 
of the organizational governance and statutory reforms on board diversity within the South African 
organizational context. The third section discusses the extant theoretical and empirical literature on 
the impact of board diversity on market valuation. The fourth section presents the research design. 
The fifth section reports empirical analyses, whilst the final section contains concluding remarks. 
 
2 Organizational Governance and Statutory Reforms on Board Diversity within the South 
African Organizational Context 
 
As previously explained, and although SA is widely perceived as one of the most ethnically diverse 
countries in the world (Armstrong et al., 2006; Andreasson, 2013), apartheid policy of racial 
segregation in every reasonably conceivable aspect of life, such as education, housing, and 
economic participation ensured that organizational boards were dominated mainly by middle class 
white males (Swartz and Firer, 2005; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a). Therefore, and following the 
collapse of apartheid in 1994, the ruling African National Congress initiated a number of reforms 
that were aimed addressing historical socio-economic inequalities between black and white South 
Africans (Rossouw et al., 2002; West, 2009). Among the reforms pursued so far, the 1994 and 2002 
King Reports on OG, the 1998 Employment Equity (EE) Act and the 2003 Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) Act are directly relevant to enhancing diversity within SA organizational 
boards.
2
   
First, and although OG had implicitly existed in SA in the form of the 1861 Companies Act, 
the general view is that the introduction of the King Reports explicitly institutionalised OG 
                                                 
2
As an illustration (and will also be discussed further in sections 5 and 7), the Appendix contains examples of annual report 
disclosures of progress made by some SA companies on complying with the 1998 employment equity and 2003 black economic 
empowerment acts. 
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practices (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012). The reports focused primarily on 
improving the way in which SA organizations are governed (King Committee, 2002), coinciding 
with international attempts (e.g., the 1992 UK Cadbury Report) at enhancing the efficacy of OG 
structures around the world, as well as preceding well-publicised cases of major organizational 
failure mainly in a number of developed economies in the 1980s, especially in the UK and US 
(King Committeee, 2002).  
Noticeably, the OG proposals contained in the King Reports were largely similar to those of 
the UK‟s Cadbury Report (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Andreasson, 2013). For example, and 
similar to the Cadbury Report, the King Reports recommended an Anglo-American style single-tier 
independently chaired board of directors, consisting of executive and independent non-executive 
directors, supported by independent committees (e.g., audit, remuneration, and nomination), and 
operating within a voluntary („comply or explain‟) OG compliance regime (King Committee, 2002; 
Armstrong et al., 2006). With particular respect to board diversity, the King Reports did not set any 
specific targets for organizations to comply with. However, the Reports suggested that every 
organization should consider whether its board is diverse enough in terms of demographics (i.e., age, 
ethnicity and gender). This is expected to ensure that the composition of SA organizational boards 
reflect the naturally diverse SA context, as well as make them effective. 
Second, and unlike the King Reports, the 1998 EE and 2003 BEE Acts focused directly on 
enhancing diversity within SA organizational boards (Andreasson, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013a). More specifically, the EE Act seeks to identify and eliminate all previous unfair and 
discriminatory employment practices on any grounds, including race and gender, requiring every 
organization to work towards achieving a balance between their non-white and white workforce 
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across all levels of the organisational hierarchy.
3
 Similarly, the BEE Act focuses on transforming 
the SA economy by de-racialising organizational ownership and management by increasing black 
ownership and direct participation in business. Specifically, the BEE Act proposes a number of 
ways by which economic transformation can be achieved, including equity ownership and 
management control with clear cut targets for organizations to meet. For example, and to address 
the low participation of blacks in executive management, the Act encourages organizations to 
appoint qualified blacks into senior management positions, including board memberships, with a 
target of 40 to 50% non-whites.  
Third, and crucially, compliance with these reforms are largely voluntary. The SA 
organizational setting is, however, distinctively characterised by high block and institutional 
shareholdings, mainly in the form of complex cross-ownerships and tall pyramids (Barr et al., 1995; 
Ntim et al., 2012). Also, shareholder activism is noticeably weak, whilst the ability to implement 
and enforce organizational laws is observably poor (Rossouw et al., 2002; Mangena and Chamisa, 
2008). Together, and given the SA organizational context, this raises critical concerns as to whether 
a voluntary compliance regime, as contained in the King Reports and the BEE Act, for example, 
will be effective in achieving meaningful diversity within SA organizational boards. Consequently, 
the main objective is to investigate the extent to which these regulatory, affirmative action, and OG 
reforms have been able to enhance diversity within the SA organizational boards, and whether the 
stock market values such diversity within SA organizational boards.   
 
3 Board Diversity and Market Value: Theory, Evidence and Hypothesis Development 
Organizational boards of directors remain one of the most crucial subgroups within the upper 
management of a considerable number of organizations (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Bilimoria and 
                                                 
3This implicitly suggests that the average SA organizations should ideally have a workforce consisting of about 80% non-whites and 
20% whites at all levels of the organizational hierarchy, including the board of directors in order to reflect the ethnic diversity and 
composition of the SA populace. 
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Piderit, 1994; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Bart and McQueen, 2013; Dale-
Olsen et al., 2013). As a group, organizational boards perform a number of strategic functions, 
including advising, monitoring, compensating and firing executives, and securing critical 
organizational resources (Pfeffer, 1973; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Abdullah, 2013; Luckerath-
Rovers, 2013; Wellage and Locke, 2013). In fact, and as discussed, one of the most significant OG 
issues currently facing SA organizations is board diversity
4
 and its impact on market valuation.   
 However, there are mixed theoretical propositions as to the impact of board diversity on 
shareholder value: those who argue for more diversity in boardrooms and those who are in favour 
of organizational monoculture and boardroom uniformity (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; du Plessis, 
2008; Kang et al., 2007; Singh, 2007; Campbell and Minquez-Vera, 2008). Proponents of diversity 
in organizational boardrooms usually base their arguments on agency, resource dependence and 
stakeholding theories (Goodstein et al., 1994; Burges and Tharenou, 2002; Dwyer et al., 2003; 
Robertson and Park, 2007; Yang and Konrad, 2011). Firstly, agency theory suggests that boards of 
diverse backgrounds increases board independence and improves executive monitoring (Kesner, 
1988; van der Walt and Ingley, 2003; Johnston and Malina, 2008; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; 
Abdullah, 2013; Triana et al., 2013), and thereby enhance market value. 
 Secondly, it brings diversity in ideas, perspectives, experience, and business knowledge to 
the decision-making process in boardrooms (Gilbert and Stead, 1999; Watson et al., 1993; 
Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013), which can facilitate better appreciation of 
the complexities of the organizational external environment. It can also increase creativity and 
innovation in boardrooms due to diversity in cognitive abilities, which can also facilitate effective 
                                                 
4Board diversity has been broadly defined as the various attributes that may be represented among directors in the boardroom in 
relation to board process and decision-making, including age, gender, ethnicity, culture, religion, constituency representation, 
independence, knowledge, educational and professional background, technical skills and expertise, commercial and industry 
experience, career and life experience (van der Walt and Ingley, 2003, p.219). In this paper, we focus only on ethnic and gender 
aspects of the board. 
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decision-making (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Carter et al., 2003; Welbourne et al., 2007; Lincoln 
and Adedoyin, 2012; Bart and McQueen, 2013), and impact positively on market valuation. 
 Thirdly, resource dependence theory indicates that board diversity can have a positive 
influence on market valuation by linking an organization to its external environment and secure 
critical resources, including skills, business contacts, prestige and legitimacy (Goodstein et al., 1994; 
Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Arnegger et al., 2013). Finally, it has been suggested that (Shrader et 
al., 1997; Ryan & Haslam, 2007; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Wellage and Locke, 2013) organizational 
boards of qualified individuals of diverse backgrounds and constituencies can help provide a better 
link with an organization‟s stakeholders, such as consumers and communities, which can improve 
its opportunities, reputation and value. Carter et al. (2003) suggest, for example, that by matching 
the diversity of an organization‟s board to the diversity of its customers and suppliers, it can 
significantly increase its ability to penetrate competitive markets.  
 However, and relying on agency and organization theories, opponents contend that board 
diversity can impact negatively on market valuation. Firstly, ethnic and gender-based board 
members may be appointed as a sign of tokenism, and as such their contributions may be 
marginalised (Hillman et al., 2007; Abdullah, 2013). Secondly, organization theory indicates that 
greater diversity within boards may significantly constrain its efforts to take decisive action and 
initiate strategic changes, especially in times of poor organizational performance and environmental 
turbulence (Goodstein et al., 1994; Krishman and Park, 2005). Thirdly, diverse board members may 
bring their individual and constituencies‟ interests and commitments to the board (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985; Wellage and Locke, 2013). The greater the diversity of these interests, the greater the 
potential for conflicts and factions to emerge among them as a group (Robertson and Park, 2007; 
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Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009), which can inhibit boardroom cohesion and performance (Goodstein 
et al., 1994; Francoeur et al., 2008; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012).
5
  
 Consistent with the conflicting nature of the theoretical literature on board diversity, 
previous evidence regarding the link between board diversity and market valuation is equally mixed 
(Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Shrader et al., 1997; Carter et al., 2003, 
2010; Ujunwa, 2012; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013). One strand of the empirical literature reports that 
more diverse boards are associated with higher market valuation (Erhardt et al., 2003; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Adler, 2010). For example, and using 25 American listed organizations, Adler (2010) 
finds a positive correlation between employing higher percentage of women in top management and 
market valuation. Carter et al. (2003) also report a positive link between board diversity and market 
value using a 1997 cross-sectional sample of 638 American organizations.  
 Consistent with prior evidence (Erhardt et al., 2003; Catalyst, 2007; Kang et al., 2007; 
Campbell and Minquez-Vera, 2008; Johnston and Malina, 2008; Robertson and Park, 2008), 
Francoeur et al. (2008) examine whether the participation of women in an organization‟s board 
improves market valuation in a sample of 230 Canadian listed organizations from 2001 to 2004. 
They report positive and significant abnormal returns in organizations with a higher proportion of 
women officers. Further, recent evidence by Mahadeo et al. (2012), Abdullah (2013), Bart and 
McQueen (2013), Luckerath-Rovers (2013), Triana et al. (2013), and Wellage and Locke (2013) 
provide additional support for the evidence of a positive association between board diversity and 
market valuation in Mauritius, Malaysia, Finland, Netherlands, US, and Sri Lanka, respectively. 
 By contrast, but consistent with the conflicting nature of prior board diversity theory, other 
studies report that board diversity rather impacts negatively on market valuation (Watson et al., 
                                                 
5This also suggests that the association between board diversity and organizational value can be non-linear, whereby initial increases 
in ethnic and gender board representations lead to declines in market valuation up to a point, beyond which additional increases in 
diversity improve market valuation (Robertson and Park, 2007). Therefore, we investigate whether there is a curvilinear relationship 
between board diversity and market valuation, as part of our robustness analyses. 
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1993; Shrader et al., 1997; Hillman et al., 2007; Ujunwa, 2012; Ujunwa et al., 2012; Dale-Olsen et 
al., 2013). Goodstein et al. (1994) investigate the impact of board diversity on an organization‟s 
ability to initiate strategic changes in a total of 335 American organizations from 1980 to 1985, and 
find that organizations with diverse boards are less likely to initiate strategic changes than those 
with homogenous boards. Shrader et al. (1997) examine the association between the percentage of 
female board members and market valuation for a 1992 cross-sectional sample of 200 American 
organizations. Their results suggest a negative relationship between the percentage of women on the 
board and market valuation, implying that while the views of women on the board may be 
marginalised, their presence may also have financial costs implications for the organization, which 
can impact negatively on market valuation. Recent evidence by Ujunwa (2012), Ujunwa et al. 
(2012), and Dale-Olsen et al. (2013) supports the theoretical prediction that firms that have more 
women on their boards tend to be valued lowly.  
 A third stream of empirical studies (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Farrell and Hersch, 2005; 
Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Rose, 2007), indicates that board diversity has no impact on market 
valuation. For example, and using a sample of 95 American listed organizations, Zahra and Stanton 
(1988) find no significant relationship between board diversity and market valuation. Similarly, 
Rose (2007) investigates whether female board representation influence market valuation using a 
sample of Danish listed organizations over the period 1998-2001. Consistent with the evidence of 
Zahra and Stanton (1988), he finds no significant link between market valuation and female board 
representation. Observably, these studies have focused mainly on how gender diversity within 
organizational boards impacts on their market valuation, resulting in limited insights on how ethnic 
diversity within boards influence their dynamics, as a top management group and market valuation. 
 With respect to SA, and as has been discussed, both the 1998 EE and 2003 BEE Acts 
directly seek to enhance ethnic and gender diversity within SA organizational boards.  Similarly, 
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the King Reports require organizations to regularly review ethnic and gender composition of their 
boards, so as to not only reflect the diverse SA context, but also enhance effective operations. 
Together, these regulatory and OG reforms appear to suggest that board diversity can impact 
positively on market valuation. However, and given the mixed international evidence, we predict a 
statistically significant association between board diversity and market valuation without being 
specific about the direction of the sign of the coefficient. Therefore, our main hypothesis to be 
tested in this study is that: 
 H1: There is either a statistically significant negative or positive association between 
board diversity on the basis of both ethnicity and gender, and market valuation. 
 
 
4 Research Design 
4.1 Sample and data 
As at 31/12/2007, a total of 402 organizations from ten industries, namely: basic materials; 
consumer goods; consumer services; financials; health care; industrials; oil & gas; technology; 
telecoms; and utilities were listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  Due to capital structure 
and regulatory reasons, 111 financials and utilities were excluded from the sample, leaving us with 
291 organizations from eight non-financial industries to be sampled. We needed data on OG and 
financial variables to investigate the association between board diversity and market value. The OG 
variables were collected from the sampled organizations‟ annual reports, which were downloaded 
from the Perfect Information Database. The financial data were collected from DataStream. The 
organizations in our final sample had to satisfy two criteria: the accessibility to an organization‟s 
full five-year annual reports from 2002 to 2006; and the availability of an organization‟s 
corresponding financial data from 2003 to 2007.
6
   
                                                 
6Organizational board decisions take time in order to be reflected in market value (Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012). Thus, to 
circumvent potential endogenous relationship between board diversity and market valuation, we introduce a one year lag between 
board diversity and market valuation such that this year‟s organizational value depends on last year‟s governance structure similar to 
Yermack (1996) and Ntim et al. (2012), as specified in equation (1). The sample also starts from 2002 for two reasons. First, King II 
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Our criteria were motivated by a number of reasons. First, and in line with past studies 
(Yermack, 1996; Carter et al., 2003), the criteria allowed us to satisfy the requirements for a 
balanced panel data analysis. Some of the benefits that can be derived for using panel data include 
having both time-series and cross-sectional observations, more degrees of freedom and less multi-
collinearity among the variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Second, an investigation of 
five-year data with both cross-sectional and time-series properties may be useful in determining 
whether the observed cross-sectional relationship between board diversity and market valuation 
holds over-time (Carter et al., 2010; Ntim et al., 2012). This may help in drawing direct 
comparisons with the findings of previous studies (Rose, 2007; Francoeur et al., 2008; Robertson 
and Park, 2008). Using our selection criteria, the complete data needed is obtained for a total of 169 
organizations over five years and 8 industries for our empirical investigation.  
4.2 Dependent, independent and control variables 
In this subsection, we discuss the three main categories of variables that we use in our 
examination, and Table 1 contains their full definitions. First, we measure our main independent 
variable in four ways: board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE); board diversity on the 
basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of gender non-whites (i.e., black women) 
(BDIVGNW); and board diversity on the basis of both ethnicity and gender (BDIV). Second, the 
widely used Tobin‟s Q (Q) is our main dependent variable/measure for market valuation. As a 
robustness check, however, we use return on assets (ROA) and total share return (TSR), as an 
alternative accounting and market-based organizational valuation measures, respectively.  
Finally, and in line with past studies (Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Johnston and Malina, 2008; 
Dale-Olsen et al., 2013), we include below a number of control variables to control for potential 
omitted variables bias. First, organizations with greater investment opportunities often grow faster 
                                                                                                                                                                  
came into operation in 2002, and secondly, data coverage in Perfect Information/DataStream on SA listed organizations is very 
limited until 2002. The sample ends in 2007 because it is the year for which data is available.  
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(Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012) and hence, such organizations are more likely to be highly 
valued by the stock market. Therefore, we conjecture that sales growth (SGR) will correlate 
positively to market valuation. Second, organizations that invest heavily in research and 
development can obtain knowledge and technological advantages over their competitors (Shrader et 
al., 1997; Adams and Ferreira, 2009), and as such, may be highly valued by the stock market. By 
contrast, the capital intensive nature of the research and development activity (Baranchuk and 
Dybvig, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012), can impact negatively on current market valuation.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
In a similar vein, and on the one hand, organizations that use more debt can improve their 
market valuation by effectively minimising the ability of opportunistic managers to extract „free 
cash flows‟ (Jensen, 1986; Guest, 2009). On the other hand, high levels of leverage can increase the 
risk of financial distress and bankruptcy by impairing the ability of organizations to fully utilise 
commercial opportunities (Jensen, 1986; Ntim et al., 2012). This can impact negatively on market 
valuation. Also, larger organizations may have economy of scale, market power, and access to 
resources advantages over their smaller counterparts (Beiner et al., 2006; Robertson and Park, 2007) 
and therefore, may be more highly valued by the stock market. By contrast, smaller organizations 
tend to have higher opportunities to grow than larger ones (Pfeffer, 1973; Guest, 2009; Kang et al., 
2007; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Triana et al., 2013) and hence, smaller organizations may be valued 
higher by the stock market than larger organizations.  
Due to the conflicting theoretical expectations, we predict that leverage (LEV), capital 
expenditure (CAPX) and organizational size (LOGTA) will have either a negative or positive 
correlation with market valuation. Third, organizations that are cross-listed on foreign stock 
markets may be better placed to raise capital at a cheaper cost to finance growth opportunities than 
their non-cross-listed counterparts (Ntim et al., 2012), and thus may be valued more highly by the 
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stock market. Hence, we expect dual-listed organizations (DUALIST) to be positively related to 
market valuation. Fourth, DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit organizational size is positively 
related to auditor independence and audit quality, and therefore organizations audited by large audit 
organizations may be more highly valued by the stock market. Thus, we predict that the size and 
reputation of the audit organization (BIG4) will impact positively on market valuation.  
Fifth, maintaining connections with government in the form of direct government ownership 
can provide access to critical resources, such as finance and lucrative business contracts (Pfeffer, 
1973; Yang and Konrad, 2011). Therefore, we expect government ownership (GVOWN) to correlate 
positively with market valuation. Sixth, organizations that voluntarily set-up OG committee to 
specifically monitor OG standards may be in a better position to reduce the ability of self-serving 
managers to expropriate organizational resources (Ntim et al., 2012), and as such may be more 
highly valued by the stock market. Thus, we expect the presence of an OG committee (OGCO) to 
be positively associated with market valuation. Finally, and in line with past studies (Robertson and 
Park, 2007; Welbourne et al., 2007; Johnston and Malina, 2008), we expect that market valuation 
will differ across different industries and financial years. Therefore, we include industry (IND) 
dummies for the 5 remaining industries
7
: basic materials and oil & gas; consumer goods; consumer 
services and health care; industrials; and technology & telecoms; and year (YED) dummies for the 
financial years 2003 to 2007.  
 
5 Empirical Analyses and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 2 contains detailed descriptive statistics relating to different aspects of board diversity 
within SA organizations. Table 2 shows that BDIV has a wide spread, ranging from a minimum of 
                                                 
7Due to insufficient number of observations in 3 industries, namely health care, oil and gas, and telecoms industries with three, one 
and three listed organizations, respectively, were merged with the closest remaining five major industries. Consequently, the three 
health care organizations were included in the consumer services industry, the one oil and gas organization was added to the basic 
materials industry, whilst the three telecoms organizations were also shared out to the technology industry. 
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0% to a maximum of 100%, and averaging approximately at 30%. This implies that despite board 
diversity reforms pursued (BEE, EE and King Reports), the average SA listed organization‟s board 
remains dominated (70%) by white males. Our finding is largely consistent with those of past 
studies (Brammer et al., 2007; Fraucoeur et al., 2008; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Triana et al., 2013).  
For example, in a sample of 543 UK organizations, Brammer et al. (2007) find that only 23% of the 
average board members originate from diverse ethnic and gender backgrounds. Of the 30% diverse 
board members (BDIV), only 34% are women (BDIVG).  
 Similarly, and of the approximately 26% non-whites (BDIVE) found on an average 
organization‟s board, only 23% are women (BDIVGNW). Overall, only 17% of the board members 
of an average sampled organization are women (BDIVG), of which 56% are women of colour. The 
evidence of low representation of women on SA organizational boards is also consistent with the 
findings of prior studies (Carter et al., 2003; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Campbell and Minquez-
Vera, 2008; Abdullah, 2013; Ujunwa, 2012; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013). This 
notwithstanding, however, gender and ethnic diversity within SA boards are generally increasing. 
For example, BDIV has increased from 26% in 2002 to 35% in 2006, and similar increases are 
noticeable in BDIVE, BDIVG and BDIVGNW, which may be explained by the increasing 
willingness of the sampled organizations to comply with the provisions of the 1998 EE and 2003 
BEE Acts. These findings are also consistent with examples of disclosures regarding the progress 
made by some SA organizations on complying with the requirements of the EE and BEE acts that 
are reported in the Appendix. For example, AngloGold Ashanti Group, a large mining company had 
only 14% (2 out of 14) of its year 2002 board members as non-whites with no (0%) woman. By 
contrast, a significant 47% (8 out of 17) of AngloGold Ashanti‟s year 2006 board members were 
non-whites with 4 (24%) women, representing a substantial 33 percentage point increase over the 5-
year period examined. Similar positive developments and patterns are observable in the Aspen 
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Pharmacre, Harmony Gold, and Truworths International Groups (see the Appendix), as well as 
across the entire 169 sampled organizations that were analysed.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics relating to the other variables used, although for 
purposes of completeness, the summary board diversity measures are also reported. Generally, all 
the values show wide variations. For instance, and consistent with the results of Beiner et al. (2006) 
and Guest (2009), Q is between a minimum of 0.58 and a maximum of 3.58 with a mean of 1.52, 
displaying wide spread. The alternative market valuation proxies (i.e., ROA and TSR), as well as the 
control variables (i.e., BIG4, CAPX, DUALIST, GVOWN, LEV, LOGTA, OGCO and SGR) show 
wide variations, implying that our sample has been adequately chosen to achieve sufficient 
variation, and thus eschews any possibilities of sample selection bias.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
We also examined linear regression assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, 
normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. We investigated the multicollinearity assumption by 
conducting the Spearman non-parametric and Pearson parametric bivariate correlation tests among 
the variables. The results, which are not reported for the sake of brevity, but available upon request, 
suggested that no significant non-normality and multicollinearity problems were present among the 
variables. In addition, we examined scatter, P-P and Q-Q plots, studentised residuals, Cook‟s 
distances and Durbin-Watson statistics of the variables, with these tests indicating no serious 
violation of the linear regression assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and 
autocorrelation, and thereby implying that it is appropriate to carry out multivariate regression 
analyses.    
 
5.2 Multivariate regression analyses 
 18 
 
 
Organizations tend to differ in the challenges and opportunities that they encounter over 
time (Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012). This can lead to situation whereby BDIV and Q are jointly 
and dynamically determined by organizational-specific differences, such as organizational culture, 
complexity and managerial talent (Guest, 2009), which simple OLS regressions may not be able to 
detect (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010), and thereby resulting in misleading findings (Hausman, 
1978; Beiner et al., 2006; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Triana et al., 2013). As such, and given the panel 
nature of our data, as well as in line with past studies (Guest, 2009; Carter et al., 2010), we carry out 
fixed-effects regressions so as to control for possible unobserved organization-specific 
heterogeneities. We start our analysis with a fixed-effects regression model specified as follows: 
               

 
n
i
itititiitit CONTROLSBDIVGQ
1
111110                                  (1)  
where: Q is the main dependent variable; BDIVG, BDIVE, BDIV and BDIVGNW are the main 
independent variables; and CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including BIG4, CAPX, 
DUALIST, GVOWN, LEV, LOGTA, OGCO, SGR, IND and YED, and δ refers to the organizational-
level fixed-effects, made up of a vector of the mean-differences of all time variant variables.
8
 
 Table 4 reports fixed-effects regressions results of the impact of the various BDIV measures 
on Q. First, to ascertain whether the SA stock market values board diversity on the basis of gender, 
we run Q on BDIVG, including the control variables using equation (1). Statistically significant and 
positive impact of BDIVG on Q is observable in Model 1 of Table 4, and thereby providing support 
for H1, as well as the similar findings of past studies (Johnston and Malina, 2008; Adam and 
                                                 
8However, we note that our choice is between random and fixed-effects estimation techniques. Therefore, to ensure that fixed-effects 
model is appropriate, we first carry out Hausman (1978) specification test by estimating both fixed and random-effects models for 
the BDIV proxies separately using equation (1) and comparing their respective coefficients. Under the null hypothesis of consistent 
random unobserved organizational-level heterogeneity (i.e., unobserved organization-specific effects or the regressions errors are 
uncorrelated with the independent variables), random-effects estimates will be both consistent and efficient, whilst fixed-effects 
coefficients will be consistent, but inefficient (Hausman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2010). In contrast, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then 
the fixed-effects approach will provide both consistent and efficient estimates, whereas random-effects estimates will be both 
inconsistent and biased (Hausman, 1978; Gujarati, 2003). The test consistently rejects the null hypothesis of consistent random 
effects for both models at the 1% level, providing further empirical support for our decision to rely primarily on fixed-effects models. 
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Ferreira, 2009; Adler, 2010; Bart and McQueen, 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Wellage and 
Locke, 2013). Second, and whilst prior studies have examined how the presence of white women on 
organizational boards influence performance (Shrader et al., 1997; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Rose, 
2007; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Abdullah, 2013; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013), the 
effect that non-white or black women board members has on market value remains largely 
unexplored. Therefore, we seek to fill this gap within the literature by uniquely running BDIVGNW 
on Q. Statistically significant and positive effect of BDIVGNW on Q is noticeable in Model 2 of 
Table 4, and thereby providing support for H1, in addition to shedding new crucial empirical 
insights on the impact of BDIVGNW on market valuation. 
 Third, the question of whether ethnic diversity within organizational boards is valued by the 
stock market has also rarely been explicitly investigated in the past (Robertson and Park, 2007; 
Carter et al., 2003; 2010; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Abdullah, 2013; Wellage and Locke, 2013). 
Therefore, to separately examine the impact of board diversity on the basis of ethnicity on market 
valuation, we re-estimate equation (1) by replacing BDIVG with BDIVE. The coefficient of Q on 
the BDIVE in Model 3 of Table 4 is positive and statistically significant, thereby providing support 
for H1, as well as shedding new insights on the effect of BDIVE on market valuation. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 Fourth, and given the evidence of higher market valuation separately for BDIVG and BDIVE, 
respectively, we expect organizations that exhibit high levels of both gender and ethnic diversity to 
be valued more highly by the stock market. Hence, we re-regress equation (1) by replacing BDIVG 
with BDIV, which includes both BDIVG and BDIVE, in order to investigate the overall effect of 
board diversity on market valuation. Statistically significant and positive effect of BDIV on Q is 
discernible in Model 4 of Table 4, thereby providing further support for H1. Overall, our results 
imply that organizations that show greater commitment towards enhancing board diversity and 
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good governance are rewarded with higher market valuation. This evidence is also largely 
consistent with the recommendations of the 1998 EE act, the 2003 BEE act, and the 1994 and 2002 
King Reports, as well as similar findings from other markets (Erhardt et al., 2003; Francoeur et al., 
2008; Dobbin and Jung, 2011; Wellage and Locke, 2013). Theoretically, our results provide support 
for agency (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) and resource dependence theories (Pfeffer, 
1973; Yang and Konrad, 2011; Arnegger et al., 2013), which suggest that ethnic and gender 
diversity improves board independence, executive monitoring, disciplining, and decision-making, 
as well as helps to better link an organization to its external environment that can facilitate securing 
critical resources, and thereby by improving market valuation. 
 Fifth, our evidence so far suggests that both gender and ethnic diversity contributes to 
market value, but it is unclear within the empirical literature whether gender or ethnic diversity 
contributes more to market value. In a regression containing both BDIVG and BDIVE, we would 
expect the stronger contributor to market value to dominate the other. We therefore re-run equation 
(1) by including both BDIVG and BDIVE to test for the relative value relevance of gender versus 
ethnic diversity on organizational boards. The coefficient of Q on BDIVE in Model 5 of Table 4 is 
positive and statistically significant, while that on BDIVG is positive, but statistically insignificant, 
and thereby uniquely further shedding new important empirical insights on the relative value 
relevance of gender and ethnic diversity within organizational boards. Although this finding may 
also be explained by the lower number of gender representation on SA boards compared with men 
from ethic backgrounds (see Tables 2 and 3), it appears to be consistent with the view that women's 
views on the board tend to be marginalised (Shrader et al., 1997; Hillman et al., 2007; Ujunwa, 
2012; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Triana et al., 2013).  
 Finally, and the coefficients on the control variables in Models 1 to 5 of Table 4 are 
generally in line with our expectations. For example and as predicted, the coefficients on CAPX, 
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LEV and LOGTA are statistically significant and negatively related to Q, whereas BIG4, DUALIST, 
GVOWN, OGCO and SGR are statistically significant and positively associated with Q, in Models 1 
to 5. Finally, the F-values in Models 1 to 5 of Table 4 consistently reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the main independent and the control variables are equal to zero. Consistent with the 
findings of previous studies (Adam and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003, 2010), the adjusted R
2
 is 
between 21% and 32%, implying that our fixed-effects regressions can explain significant 
differences in our sampled organizations‟ Q. 
 
5.3 Robustness analyses 
Our fixed-effects regressions so far do not take into account the presence of possible non-
monotonic associations and alternative market valuation measures, as well as other potential 
endogeneities. This indicates that the evidence of a significant positive effect of BDIV on Q, for 
instance, may be misleading. In this subsection, we investigate how robust our findings are to the 
existence of potential non-linear relationships, alternative market valuation proxies, and other 
endogeneity problems.  
 First, to examine whether there is a non-monotonic link between board diversity and market 
valuation, such that initial increases in ethnic and gender board representations lead to declines in 
market valuation up to a point, beyond which additional increases in diversity improve market 
valuation, as predicted by Robertson and Park (2007), we re-estimate equation (1) using squared 
board diversity (BDIV
2
) in addition to BDIV.
9
 Positive, but statistically insignificant impact of 
BDIV
2
 on Q is discernible in Model 6 of Table 4, and thereby indicating that our evidence of a 
positive impact of BDIV on Q is not sensitive to this specification.  
                                                 
9We carried out similar non-monotonic examination for the BDIVE, BDIVG and BDIVGNW measures and found statistically 
insignificant non-linear association between board diversity and market valuation. We further investigate other forms of non-linear 
transformations, such as cubing the variables (i.e., BDIVE, BDIVG, BDIVGNW and BDIV), but we found statistically insignificant 
link between board diversity and market valuation. 
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 Second and as previously noted, we investigate the robustness of our findings to two 
alternative market valuation measures: return on assets (ROA – an accounting based measure) and 
total share returns (TSR – a market based proxy). Models 7 and 8 of Table 4 report results obtained 
by making use of ROA and TSR, respectively, instead of Q. Statistically significant and positive 
impact of BDIV on ROA and TSR in models 7 and 8 of Table 4, respectively, is observable, and 
thereby implying that our results are fairly robust to the use of either an accounting (ROA) or a 
market (TSR) based market valuation measure, instead of Q. 
Third, to account for potential additional endogeneity problems that may be caused by 
omitted variable bias, we apply the widely used two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique (Beiner et 
al., 2006; Carter et al., 2003, 2010). However, to make sure that the 2SLS research design is 
appropriate, and in line with Beiner et al. (2006), we first carry out Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
exogeneity test (see Beiner et al., 2006, p. 267) to determine whether BDIV is endogenously 
associated with Q. Applied to equation (1), the test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity, and 
therefore we conclude that the 2SLS technique may be appropriate and that our earlier results based 
on the fixed-effects regressions may be misleading.
 
In the first stage, we conjecture that BDIV will 
be determined by all the control (exogenous) variables specified in equation (1). In the second stage, 
we utilise the predicted portion of the BDIV (PRE_BDIV) as an instrument for the BDIV and re-
estimate equation (1) as specified below:
 
                              


n
i
itititiitit CONTROLSBDIVQ
1
10
ˆ                            (2) 
whereby everything remains unchanged as specified in equation (1)
10
 except that we use the 
predicted BDIV (PRE_BDIV) from the first-stage regression as an instrument for the BDIV. 
                                                 
10As estimating a lagged structure will jeopardise the validity of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010), 
we estimate equation (2) as un-lagged structure. An additional advantage is that it allows us to ascertain the robustness of our results 
against estimating an un-lagged structure.  
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Statistically significant and positive effect of the PRE_BDIV on Q is noticeably in Model 9 of Table 
4, and thereby indicating that our evidence of a positive effect of BDIV on Q is not sensitive to 
endogeneity problems that may be caused by potential omitted variables. Overall, the robustness 
analyses indicate that our results are fairly robust to potential endogeneity problems, non-linear 
associations, and alternative market valuation proxies.  
 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
 Organizational boards of directors are one of the most important subgroups within most modern 
organizations, performing a number of critical roles, such as advising, monitoring, disciplining, 
motivating, and compensating managers, as well as providing access to critical resources, such as 
contracts and finance. This paper has attempted to determine whether the South African (SA) stock 
market values ethnic and gender diversity within organizational boards using a sample of 169 
publicly listed organizations from 2002 to 2007. This coincides with a period during which the SA 
authorities embarked upon regulatory, affirmative action and organizational governance (OG) 
reforms, noticeably including the 1998 Employment Equity (EE) Act, 2003 Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) Act, and the 1994 and 2002 King Reports. These reforms have focused 
primarily on enhancing ethnic and gender diversity within organizational boards in order to improve 
their independence and monitoring power, and thereby enhancing overall market valuation.  
 Our results contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, our summary descriptive 
statistics suggest a wide spread in the distribution of board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and 
gender, ranging from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 100%, and averaging approximately at 
30%. This implies that despite board diversity reforms pursued (e.g., BEE, EE and King Reports), 
the average SA listed organization‟s board remains dominated (70%) by white males. This 
notwithstanding, however, the evidence also suggests that gender and ethnic diversity within SA 
boards are generally increasing. For example, general board diversity has increased from 26% in 
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2002 to 35% in 2006, and similar increases are noticeable in ethnicity and gender, which may be 
explained by the increasing willingness of the sampled organizations to comply with the provisions 
of the 1998 EE and 2003 BEE Acts. These findings are also in line with examples of disclosures 
regarding the progress made by some SA organizations on complying with the requirements of the 
EE and BEE acts that are presented in the Appendix.  
 Second, we find a statistically significant and positive relationship between board diversity 
and market valuation, implying that the SA stock market values ethnic and gender diversity within 
organizational boards. Third and distinct from prior studies, we show further that ethnic diversity is 
valued more highly by the SA stock market than gender diversity. This sheds new crucial insights 
on the relative value relevance of gender versus ethnic diversity on market valuation. Fourth and by 
contrast, we do not find any evidence of a significant non-linear link between board diversity and 
market valuation. Our findings are consistent across a raft of econometric models that take into 
consideration different types of endogeneity problems and market valuation measures.  
 Overall, our results provide support for agency and resource dependence theories, which 
suggest that ethnic and gender diversity improves board independence, executive monitoring and 
decision-making, as well as helps to better link an organization to its external environment that can 
facilitate securing critical resources, and thereby enhancing market valuation. Resource dependence 
may be particularly powerful in explaining our evidence of a positive effect of board diversity on 
market value in SA. This is because securing and renewing profitable government contracts and 
mining licenses in SA are usually linked to complying with affirmative action policies, such as 
those contained in the 1998 EE and 2003 BEE acts (Rossouw et al., 2012; West, 2009; Andreasson, 
2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a). This means that by appointing more board members from 
diverse ethnic and gender backgrounds, SA organizations may be inherently complying with the EE 
and BEE acts. As the EE and BEE acts are backed by the government, this may be a major way by 
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which SA organizations can win government support and gain access to critical resources, such as 
government contracts and contacts, finance, and tax concessions that can facilitate growth and 
improve long-term financial performance. 
 Our evidence also has important implications for governments, policy-makers, and 
regulatory authorities. Whereas our evidence of a positive effect of board diversity on market 
valuation provides support for the recommendations of the EE and BEE Acts, as well as those of 
the King Reports, the relatively low levels of ethnic and gender diversity within SA organizational 
boards appear to suggest that there is the need to strengthen enforcement and compliance with the 
provisions of the reforms. In this case, setting up a “compliance and enforcement committee” to 
regularly check the levels of compliance among listed organizations may help in improving board 
diversity specifically, but OG standards more generally. Our SA findings will also have particular 
implications for countries that are currently and/or contemplating pursuing board diversity reforms. 
Specifically, our findings will be of specific interests and added impetus to regulators, policy-
makers and governments in Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, India, Malaysia, 
Norway, Mozambique, New Zealand, and the USA, amongst others, where different variants of 
affirmative action policies are being pursed with the aim of improving racial, ethnic minority and/or 
gender representation in top corporate management. 
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Table 1 Summary of variables 
Organizational valuation/dependent variables 
Q The ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to   
total assets.   
ROA  The percentage of operating profit to total assets.  
TSR The percentage of annualised total share returns made up of share price and 
dividends.  
Organizational governance/independent variables  
BDIV The percentage of non-whites (i.e., of Black African, Indian, Chinese and Mixed 
Race backgrounds) and females (i.e., women) to the total number of directors on an 
organizational board.  
BDIVE The percentage of non-whites (i.e., of Black African, Indian, Chinese and Mixed 
Race backgrounds) to the total number of directors on an organizational board. 
BDIVG The percentage of females (i.e., women) to the total number of directors on an 
organizational board. 
BDIVGNW  The percentage of non-white females (i.e., black women) to the total number of 
directors on an organizational board. 
BSIZE The total number of directors on the board of an organization.  
Control variables 
BIG4 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if an organization is audited by a big 
four audit organization (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & 
Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.  
CAPX  The percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets.   
DUALIST A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if an organization is cross-listed on a  
  foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. 
GVOWN A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership is at least 5%, 
  0 otherwise.  
LEV  The percentage of total debts to market value of equity. 
LOGTA The natural log of total assets. 
OGCO  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if an organization has set up an  
  organizational governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
SGR  The percentage of the current year‟s sales minus last year‟s sales to last year‟s sales. 
IND  Industry dummies for the five main remaining industries. 
YED  Year dummies from 2003 to 2007 inclusive. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of board diversity expressed as a percentage of board size 
         All          2002    2003  2004   2005  2006 
Panel A: Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and gender (BDIV) - (%) 
Mean       29.85     25.98   26.34  28.51  33.50  34.91  
Median       26.67     24.29   21.11  23.33  30.00  30.00  
SDV       29.20     25.57   28.89  30.57  28.44  29.71  
Min         0.00       0.00     0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
Max     100.00     81.82             100.00            100.00            100.00            100.00 
Sample (N)    845                  169                  169                  169                    169                    169 
Panel B: Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE) -  (%) 
Mean       25.77               22.22   23.29  24.72  28.80  29.80 
Median       22.50     19.09   19.09  20.00  26.67  26.67 
SDV       26.90     24.24   26.74  27.39  27.13  27.57 
Min         0.00       0.00     0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
Max     100.00     72.73               80.00              80.00            100.00            100.00 
Sample (N)    845                  169                  169                  169                    169                     169 
Panel C: Board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG) -  (%) 
Mean       17.73     16.75   17.45  17.89  17.92  18.61 
Median       15.00     10.00   10.00  15.26  10.00  15.89 
SDV       20.03     18.62   19.85  20.54  20.19  20.84 
Min         0.00       0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
Max       60.00     63.33              50.00  60.00  50.00  60.00 
Sample (N)    845                  169                 169                   169                    169                     169 
Panel D: Board diversity on the basis of gender non-whites alone (BDIVGNW) - (%) 
Mean       14.33               13.22  13.71  13.97  15.16  15.57 
Median       10.00               10.00  10.00  10.00  10.00  10.00 
SDV       17.02               15.77  15.99  16.66  17.85  18.28 
Min         0.00                 0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
Max       43.33               35.00  37.27  35.00  43.33  43.33 
Sample (N)    845                  169                 169                   169                    169                    169 
 
Panel E: Other Relevant Board Diversity Statistics 
Gender (non-white and white women or females) as a percentage (%) of board diversity: 
Mean       34.30               33.70               33.80               34.00                  34.70                 35.50    
Ethnicity (non-white males and females) as a percentage (%) of board diversity: 
Mean         84.40                79.70               80.60               84.60                  85.70                 88.30 
Non-white women as a percentage (%) of gender (white and non-white women or females): 
Mean         55.60                40.70               41.70               53.30                  59.80                 69.90 
Non-white women (gender) as a percentage (%) of ethnicity (non-white males and females): 
Mean         22.60                17.10               17.40               20.80                  24.20                 28.10 
Note: All figures have been expressed as a percentage of total organizational board size (BSIZE). For comparison purposes, and as 
also reported in Table 3, the average board size of our sample is 9.75 or approximately 10 directors, ranging from a minimum of 4 to 
a maximum of 18.  
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Table 3 Summary descriptive statistics of all variables for all 845 observations 
Variable   Mean            Median           Std. dev.       Maximum        Minimum 
Panel A: Organizational valuation (dependent) variables 
Q                 1.52    1.33    0.69               3.58               0.58  
ROA (%)                      10.26             10.97  12.21  36.55            -23.19  
TSR (%)              33.57              29.60             48.68            173.41            -55.20 
Panel B: Organizational governance (independent) variables 
BDIV (%)   29.85  26.67  29.20    0.00             100.00 
BDIVE (%)   25.77  22.50             26.90               0.00             100.00 
BDIVG (%)                  17.73              15.00               20.03                 0.00               100.00 
BDIVGNW (%)  14.33              10.00               17.02                 0.00                 43.33 
BSIZE      9.75              10.00                 3.67                 4.00               18.00 
Panel C: Control variables 
BIG4 (%)                     73.25            100.00                44.29              100.00                 0.00 
CAPX (%)              11.08   6.28  13.86    64.46                 0.00 
DUALIST (%)   21.66   0.00  41.21            100.00                 0.00 
GVOWN (%)              38.00   0.00  49.00            100.00                 0.00 
LEV (%)              34.78            14.63             55.02            270.65                 0.00 
LOGTA     5.95               5.97                  0.89                  7.60                  4.08 
OGCO (%)   35.80   0.00  48.00            100.00                 0.00 
SGR (%)   14.40            12.60             24.94             88.26              -41.88 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin‟s Q (Q), measured as the ratio of total assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity to total assets.  Return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of operating profit to total assets. 
Total shareholder returns (TSR), calculated as annualised total share returns made up of share price and dividends. 
Board diversity (BDIV), estimated as the percentage of non-whites (i.e., of Black African, Indian, Chinese and Mixed 
Race backgrounds) and females (i.e., women) to the total number of directors on an organizational board. Board 
diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE), estimated as the percentage of non-whites (i.e., of Black African, Indian, 
Chinese and Mixed Race backgrounds) to the total number of directors on an organizational board. Board diversity on 
the basis of gender (BDIVG), measured as the percentage of females (i.e., women) to the total number of directors on an 
organizational board. Board diversity on the basis of gender non-whites (BDIVGNW), estimated as the percentage of 
non-white females (i.e., black women) to the total number of directors on an organizational board. Board size (BSZIE), 
which refers to the total number of directors on the board of an organization, is reported for comparison purposes only. 
Audit organization size (BIG4), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if an organization is audited by 
a big four audit organization (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
Capital expenditure (CAPX), calculated as the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. The presence of an 
organizational governance committee (OGCO), defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set 
up an organizational governance committee, 0 otherwise. Dual-listing (DUALIST), measured as a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1, if an organization is cross-listed to a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. Government ownership 
(GVOWN), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership is at least 5%, 0 otherwise. 
Leverage (LEV), calculated as the ratio of total debts to market value of equity. Organizational size (LOGTA), measured 
as the natural log of total assets. Sales growth (SGR), calculated as the current year‟s sales minus last year‟s sales to last 
year‟s sales.  
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Table 4 Fixed-effects regressions of the relationship between board diversity and market valuation 
Dep. variables Q Q Q Q Q Q ROA TSR 2SLS (Q) 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
(N) 
      0.248 
    5.092*** 
(845) 
         0.206 
     4.594*** 
         (845) 
        0.265 
   6.980*** 
(845) 
        0.315 
   7.984*** 
(845) 
       0.296 
 7.670*** 
(845) 
      0.189 
      4.378*** 
       (845) 
0.326  
   8.248*** 
 (845) 
0.382  
   9.543*** 
 (845) 
     0.394 
     9.836*** 
(845) 
Constant      1.086 
    (0.000)*** 
        1.050 
       (0.000)*** 
        1.098 
      (0.000)*** 
        1.193 
       (0.000)*** 
       1.180 
      (0.000)*** 
      1.036 
     (0.000)***
 
        -0.410 
       (0.138) 
        2.694 
       (0.000)*** 
     1.282 
  (0.000)*** 
Indep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BDIVG 
 
BDIVNW
 
 
BDIVE 
 
BDIV/BDIV
2 
 
PRE_BDIV 
 
     0.054 
    (0.018)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.040 
   (0.026)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.062 
    (0.010)***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
   0.080 
        (0.000)*** 
- 
- 
0.002 
(0.285) 
- 
- 
0.072 
    (0.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.035
 
   (0.042)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.004 
(0.271) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 - 
- 
- 
- 
0.625 
    (0.000)***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.680 
    (0.000)***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
      0.095 
     (0.000)*** 
Cont. variables          
BIG4 
 
CAPX 
 
DUALIST 
 
GVOWN 
 
LEV 
 
LOGTA 
 
OGCO 
 
SGR 
 
IND 
YED 
0.138 
  (0.035)**
 
-0.014 
    (0.000)***
 
0.195 
    (0.000)***
 
0.115 
 (0.068)*
 
-0.016 
  (0.073)*
 
-0.139 
   (0.030)** 
0.186 
   (0.020)** 
0.019 
  (0.060)* 
Included 
Included 
0.129 
   (0.043)**
 
-0.008 
    (0.015)**
 
0.169 
    (0.000)***
 
0.118 
 (0.053)*
 
-0.018 
  (0.069)* 
-0.129 
   (0.037)** 
0.165 
  (0.028)** 
0.014 
 (0.067)* 
Included 
Included 
       0.144 
      (0.025)** 
      -0.017 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.228 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.126 
      (0.030)** 
      -0.020 
      (0.066)* 
      -0.147 
      (0.026)** 
       0.194 
      (0.013)** 
       0.022 
      (0.054)* 
     Included 
     Included 
         0.182 
        (0.000)*** 
        -0.022 
        (0.000)*** 
         0.245 
        (0.000)*** 
         0.296 
        (0.000)*** 
        -0.028 
        (0.034)** 
        -0.286 
        (0.000)*** 
         0.249 
        (0.000)*** 
         0.128 
        (0.030)** 
        Included 
        Included 
       0.175 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.019 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.233 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.259 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.023 
      (0.039)** 
      -0.273 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.235 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.140 
      (0.025)** 
      Included 
      Included 
      0.124 
     (0.048)** 
     -0.007 
     (0.023)** 
      0.152 
     (0.020)** 
      0.103 
     (0.077)* 
     -0.012 
     (0.086)* 
     -0.128 
     (0.044)** 
      0.146 
     (0.037)** 
      0.011 
     (0.076)* 
     Included 
     Included 
 0.118 
   (0.054)* 
-0.038 
    (0.000)*** 
0.094 
  (0.065)* 
0.749 
    (0.000)*** 
-0.428 
    (0.000)*** 
-0.560 
    (0.000)*** 
0.454 
    (0.000)*** 
  0.385 
     (0.000)*** 
Included 
Included 
0.216 
    (0.000)***
 
-0.029 
     (0.000)***
 
0.250 
    (0.000)***
 
0.862 
    (0.000)***
 
-0.475 
    (0.000)***
 
-0.614 
    (0.000)*** 
0.476 
    (0.000)*** 
0.402 
    (0.000)*** 
Included 
Included 
0.205 
    (0.000)*** 
     -0.032 
    (0.000)*** 
0.314 
    (0.000)*** 
0.292 
   (0.000)*** 
-0.036 
     (0.000)*** 
-0.318 
     (0.000)*** 
 0.260 
     (0.000)*** 
 0.135 
    (0.020)** 
Included 
Included 
Notes: P-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using the robust clustered 
standard errors technique along both industry and year dimensions. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin‟s (Q), return on assets (ROA), total share return (TSR), board diversity on the basis of ethnicity 
(BDIVE), board diversity on the basis of gender , including (BDIVG) and excluding (BDIVGNW) whites, board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and gender (BDIV)/squared (BDIV2), predicted  BDIV 
(PRE_BDIV) – obtained by regressing BDIV on the control variables and used as an instrument for BDIV in model 9, audit organization size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPX), dual-listing (DUALIST), 
government ownership (GVOWN), leverage (LEV), organizational size (LOGTA), the presence of an organizational governance committee (OGCO), sales growth (SGR), industry dummies (IND), and year 
dummies (YED). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Examples of annual report disclosures of progress on complying with the employment equity and black economic empowerment acts 
Company 
name 
Examples of disclosures regarding progress on complying with the 
1998 employment equity act in company annual reports 
Examples of disclosures regarding progress on complying with the 2003 black economic 
empowerment act in company annual reports 
AngloGold 
Ashanti 
Group 
“In October 2006, AngloGold Ashanti submitted its sixth annual employment 
equity report to the Department of Labour on progress made with the 
implementation of the company‟s employment equity plan in respect of its South 
African operations. The 2006 report indicates that some progress has been 
made year-on-year. Employment equity governance structures and monitoring 
processes have been entrenched at company and business unit levels”.  
(AngloGold Ashanti, 2006, p.103). 
In early October 2006, AngloGold Ashanti announced the proposed launch of an Employee Share Ownership 
Plan (ESOP) and a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) transaction, both of which were approved by 
shareholders at a general meeting held on 11 December 2006. Shareholders approved the issue of up to 
960,000 ordinary shares to nearly 31,000 South African employees eligible for participation of 30 shares per 
individual worker at an issue price of R320 per share. These shares were issued to the individual workers at nil 
cost. In addition, each eligible employee was allotted 90 E ordinary shares (“loan shares”) issued at a fair 
value of R126.80 per share. These shares will vest in five equal tranches over the next eight years. The BEE 
transaction allows Izingwe Holdings (Pty) Ltd, a private South African investment company, to acquire 1.4 
million „loan shares‟ at an issue price of R0.25 per share under terms similar to those of the ESOP.” 
(AngloGold Ashanti, 2006, p.103). 
Aspen 
Pharmacare 
Group 
“All of the Group‟s South African businesses comply fully with the 
requirements for the submission of information to the Department of Labour. 
Aspen focuses on the recruitment and retention of suitable historically 
disadvantaged candidates on merit. Aspen seeks to develop historically 
disadvantaged employees who demonstrate potential as a part of the Group‟s 
overall succession planning. Particular emphasis is placed on the Group‟s 
Leadership Academy, where suitable candidates are identified through a tailor-
made selection and interview process.  On 1 September 2006 Sindi Zilwa was 
appointed to the Board. Sindi became the second black woman chartered 
accountant in South Africa in 1990. Her qualifications include an Advanced 
Taxation Certificate (UNISA), an Advanced Diploma in Financial Planning 
(UOFS) and an Advanced Diploma in Banking (RAU). Sindi is the Chief 
Executive of Nkonki Chartered Accountants, and has also been a member of the 
GAAP Monitoring Panel. She holds non-executive directorships with 
Woolworths Ltd, Primedia Ltd, Discovery Ltd and Strate Ltd. Sindi is also the 
Chairperson of the BUSA Standing Committee on Transformation”. (Aspen, 
2006, pp.34, 45). 
“On 17 November 2005 the Group established a formal Transformation Committee inter alia to monitor 
Aspen‟s compliance with the industry scorecard in respect of BEE and to liaise with the relevant authorities on 
the Healthcare Charter. The committee is tasked primarily with assisting the Board in Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (“BBBEE”) compliance and adherence to best-practice transformation principles. At 
present 40,1 million ordinary shares in Aspen are owned by BBBEE shareholders whose ownership has been 
facilitated by Aspen. BBBEE shareholders control a further 17,6 million preference shares which have rights of 
conversion into Aspen ordinary shares on a one-for-one basis in June 2012. The preference shares enjoy full 
voting rights on a parri passu basis with ordinary shares in Aspen. One of the BBBEE shareholders, Imithi 
Investments (Pty) Ltd, has a call option over a further 6,1 million ordinary shares currently held by the 
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd. Aspen‟s current effective BBBEE holding in the 
Group‟s South African business at year-end (the shareholding measured under the Department of Trade and 
Industry‟s Code of Good Practice on BBBEE (“the Codes”)) amounts to 17%. Upon exercise of the call option, 
the effective shareholding in the South African business as measured under the Codes could increase to 19%. 
The main shareholder under the BBBEE ownership facilitated by Aspen is CEPPWAWU Development Trust 
and its subsidiaries. The CEPPWAWU Development Trust benefits the 70 000 CEPPWAWU members who 
include Aspen unionised employees. Other BBBEE shareholders include black women and healthcare 
professionals. In addition an estimated 6% of Aspen‟s shares are indirectly held by BEE investors”. (Aspen, 
2006, pp.44-45). 
Harmony 
Gold 
Group 
“In considering new appointments to the board, Harmony takes cognisance of 
the gender and racial mix of its members and believes that it has achieved an 
acceptable balance. Page 105, 2006, HGM. The Empowerment Committee was 
established by the board to ensure that the company meets not only regulations 
stipulated in the Employment Equity Act, the Labour Relations Act and the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act‟s Mining Charter 
Scorecard, but also in fulfilment of Harmony‟s own empowerment imperatives. 
The Empowerment Committee complies fully with its charter”. (Harnony, 2006, 
pp.106, 114). 
“The primary purpose of the Investment Committee is to ensure that the capital projects have been adequately 
reviewed and budgeted for, due diligence and any other procedures for mergers and acquisitions have been 
followed, and cognisance has been taken of BEE requirements. The total number of shares to be reserved for 
the Broad-based Scheme will be 5% of our issued share capital, will be granted under the Broad-based 
Scheme, subject to certain employee performance-linked milestones which can be realistically achieved. Once 
achieved, the value is unlocked to the Broad-based Scheme for the ultimate benefit of the non-managerial 
employees. Management and employees will jointly participate in the structuring of the Broad-based Scheme. It 
is the intention of the company to structure the Broad-based Scheme to maximise the recognition of black 
participation therein, both from the perspective of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act and 
the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act”. (Harmony, 2006, pp.115, 143). 
Truworths 
Interna- 
tional 
Group 
“At the top management level, there is currently one black female non-
executive director on the TI board, and one female executive director on the 
Truworths board. Currently 55% of all managers are black, and 70% are 
female. Historically low labour turnover of employees at senior and top 
management levels will mean that empowerment at these levels will take time. 
The transformation committee in conjunction with the HR department is 
implementing a policy and programme to increase the number of black people 
and women in senior management positions through skills development 
initiatives”. (Truworths, 2006, p.121). 
“Our initial BBBEE focus has been on skills transfer and the upliftment of our own employees in line with our 
human resources policy to ensure that we retain and grow existing talent within the business and offer 
opportunities for advancement internally. Further information on our progress in this regard can be found on 
page 120. Truworths supports Government‟s broad-based black economic empowerment policy, as contained 
in the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act and the Department of Trade and Industry‟ codes of 
good practice (DTI code) and scorecard. The committee‟s initial focus will be on areas that are beneficial to 
the sustainability of the Group‟s business such as procurement, employment equity, skills development and the 
upliftment of employees. In addition, the Group‟s corporate social investment strategy will be reviewed to 
ensure that it enhances the Group‟s BBBEE strategies”. (Truworths, 2006, pp.14, 120-121). 
 
